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foreign

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thank you

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the hearing will come to order I'd first

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like to thank our witness Dr Sean

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Kirkpatrick for testifying here and in

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today's earlier closed session and for

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his long and distinguished career both

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in the intelligence community and in the

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Department of Defense Dr Kirkpatrick is

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the director of the all domain anomaly

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resolution office or Arrow Congress

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established this office in law to get to

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the bottom of the very serious problem

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of unidentified anomalous phenomenon or

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UAP Dr Kirkpatrick has a very difficult

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Mission while we have made progress

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there remains a stigma attached to these

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phenomenon there is a vast and complex

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citizen engagement and there's also very

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challenging scientific and Technical

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hurdles so we appreciate the willingness

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of Dr Kirkpatrick to lean in on this

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issue and the work that he has

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accomplished thus far and we look

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forward to both his opening statement

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and his presentation of examples of the

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work Arrow has done in late 2017 media

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reports surfaced about activity set in

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motion by the late long-serving majority

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leader Senator Harry Reid more than a

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decade ago we learned that there was

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strong evidence that advanced technology

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reflected in the features and

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performance characteristics of many

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objects observed by our highly trained

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service members operating top of the

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line military equipment

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we learned that for the at least the

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past eight years military Pilots

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frequently encountered unknown objects

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in controlled airspace off both the east

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and west coast across the continental

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United States in test and training areas

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and ranges we don't know where they are

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they come from who made them or how they

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operate as former deputy secretary of

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defense David norquist observed had any

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of these objects had the label made in

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China there would be an uproar in the

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government and media there would be no

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stone unturned and no efforts spared to

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find out what we were dealing with we

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can look at the recent incursion of the

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unidentified PRC high altitude balloon

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for as an example

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because and but because of the UFO

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stigma the response has been

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irresponsibly anemic and slow Congress

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established Arrow we made it clear that

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we expect vigorous action we added very

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substantial initial funding for the

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office but despite our best efforts the

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president's budget for fiscu is 23 and

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24 requested only enough funding to

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defray the operating expenses of Arrow

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it included almost no funds to sustain

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the critical research and development

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necessary to support a serious

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investigation it took a letter to

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secretary Austin from Senator Rubio and

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me and 14 other Senators to get the

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office temporary relief for the current

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fiscal year in this hearing I tend to

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probe a series of specific issues in the

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recent incidents where multiple objects

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were shot down over North America it

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seemed that Pentagon leadership did not

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turn to Aero office to play a leading

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role in advising the combatant commander

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we need to know whether this will

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continue we need to know whether the

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leadership in DOD will bring Arrow into

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the decision-making process in a visible

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way and we need to know what role era

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will play in inter-agency coordination

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after the NSC working group display fans

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in the fiscal year 2023 National Defense

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and intelligence authorization acts

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Congress established a direct reporting

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chain from the arrow director to the

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deputy secretary of defense the role of

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the office of the under secretary of

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defense for intelligence and security is

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limited to providing administrative

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support we need to know how this

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direction is being implemented uapf

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frequently observed flying in extremely

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high or very low speeds and come in

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various sizes and shapes during the

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recent shoot Downs over North America

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DOD disclosed that filters on radar

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systems were adjusted to allow for

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detection and tracking of diverse sets

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of objects for the first time while

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opening the aperture can overload the

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real-time analytic process we cannot

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keep turning a blind eye to surveillance

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data that is critical to detecting

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attracting UAP we need to know whether

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Dr Kirkpatrick could achieve the

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necessary control over sensor filters

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and the storage and access to Raw

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surveillance data to find UAP anomalies

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finally one of the tasks Congress set

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for Arrow is serving as an open door for

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Witnesses of UAP events or participants

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in government activities related to uaps

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to come forward securely and disclose

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what they know without fear of

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Retribution for any possible violations

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of previously signed non-disclosure

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agreements Congress mandated that arrow

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set up a publicly discoverable and

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accessible process for safe disclosure

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while we know that Arrow has already

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conducted a significant a number of

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interviews many referred by Congress we

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need to set up a public process that

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that and we need to know where that

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effort stands with that I'd like to turn

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to Senator Ernst for her opening

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statement thank you madam chair and

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thank you Dr Kirkpatrick for your

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testimony today I'll keep these remarks

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very brief so that we have maximum time

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for your briefing the recent Downing of

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the Chinese surveillance surveillance

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balloon and three other objects

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underscores the need for domain

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awareness adversaries like China and

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Russia are working to hold U.S interests

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including our homeland at risk that's

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why your testimony is so important and I

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so look forward to a progress update on

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the establishment of your office as

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members know your office evolved from

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the navy-led unidentified aerial

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phenomena task force to the all-domain

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anomalous resolution office known as

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Arrow Dr Kirkpatrick your extensive

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background in science and technology

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research and development and space makes

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you well suited to discuss these

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emerging challenges my priority is that

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we understand the full range of threats

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posed by our adversaries in all domains

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that is what the Joint Force needs to be

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prepared to fight and win in defense of

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our nation this committee needs to know

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about Chinese or Russian advanced

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technology programs to exploit our

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vulnerabilities and it needs to know

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whether your office along with the IC

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has detected potential Chinese or

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Russian capabilities to surveil or

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attack us finally we need to ensure

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efficient interagency coordination

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multiple elements of the dod and IC own

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a piece of this mission to add value

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arrows efforts cannot be redundant with

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others thank you again we look forward

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to your testimony

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Dr Kirkpatrick you can give your

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testimony

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thank you chairwoman Jewel brand ranking

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member Ernst distinguished members of

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the subcommittee

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it's a privilege to be here today to

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testify on the defense defense's efforts

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to address unidentified anomalous

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phenomena

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first I want to thank Congress for its

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extensive and continued partnership as

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the department works to better

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understand and respond to UAP in an

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effort to minimize Technical and

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intelligence surprise

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unidentified objects in any domain pose

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potential risks to Safety and Security

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particularly from military personnel and

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capabilities

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Congress and DOD agree that UAP cannot

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remain unexamined or unaddressed

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we are grateful for sustained

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Congressional engagement on this issue

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which paved the way for the dod's

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establishment of the all-domain anomaly

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resolution office in July of last year

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though arrow is still a young office the

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spotlight on UAP in recent months

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underscores the importance of its work

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and the need for UAP to be taken

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seriously as a matter of National

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Security

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all leadership that I've had the

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pleasure of working with whether DOD IC

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doe civil scientific or industrial view

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Congress as a critical partner in this

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endeavor

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Arrow has accomplished much in the last

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nine months since it was established the

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Aero team of more than three dozen

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experts is organized around four

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functional areas operations scientific

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research integrated analysis and

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strategic Communications

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in the nine months since era's

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establishment we've taken important

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steps to involve and improve UAP data

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collection standardize the Department's

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UAP internal reporting requirements and

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Implement a framework for rigorous

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scientific and intelligence analysis

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allowing us to resolve cases in a

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systematic and prioritized manner

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meanwhile consistent with legislative

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direction arrow is also carefully

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reviewing and researching the U.S

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government's UAP related historical

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record

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arrow is leading a focused effort to

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better characterize understand and

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attribute UAP

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with priority given to UAP reports by

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DOD and IC Personnel in or near areas of

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National Security importance

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DOD fully appreciates the eagerness from

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many

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quarters especially here in Congress and

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in the American public to quickly

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resolve every UAP encountered across the

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globe from the distant pass through

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today

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it's important to note however

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arrow is the culmination of Decades of

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DOD intelligence community and

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congressionally directed efforts to

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successfully resolve UAP encountered

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first and foremost by U.S military

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personnel specifically Navy and Air

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Force pilots

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the law establishing arrow is ambitious

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and it will take time to realize the

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full mission we cannot answer Decades of

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questions about UAP all at once but we

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must begin somewhere while I assure you

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that Arrow will follow scientific

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evidence wherever it leads I ask for

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your patience as DOD first prioritizes

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Safety and Security of our military

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personnel and installations in all

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domains

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after all a UAP encountered first by

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highly capable DOD and IC platforms

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featuring the nation's most advanced

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sensors are those UAP most likely to be

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resolved by my office assuming the data

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can be collected

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if Arrow succeeds in first improving the

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ability of military personnel to quickly

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and confidently resolve UAP they

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encounter I believe that in time we will

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have greatly Advanced the capability of

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the entire United States government

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including its civilian agencies to

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resolve UAP

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however it would be naive to believe

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that the resolution of all UAP can be

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solely accomplished by the dod and IC

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alone

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we will need to prioritize collection

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and leverage authorities for monitoring

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all domains within the continental

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United States

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Arrow's ultimate success will require

286
00:13:25,310 --> 00:13:22,639
Partnerships with the interagency

287
00:13:26,930 --> 00:13:25,320
industry Partners Academia and the

288
00:13:27,949 --> 00:13:26,940
scientific Community as well as the

289
00:13:29,690 --> 00:13:27,959
public

290
00:13:32,030 --> 00:13:29,700
Aero is partnering with the services

291
00:13:33,590 --> 00:13:32,040
intelligence Community doe as well as

292
00:13:35,870 --> 00:13:33,600
civil partners and across the U.S

293
00:13:37,730 --> 00:13:35,880
government to tap into this resources of

294
00:13:40,430 --> 00:13:37,740
the interagency

295
00:13:43,009 --> 00:13:40,440
the UAP challenge is more an operational

296
00:13:44,509 --> 00:13:43,019
and scientific issue than it is an

297
00:13:46,790 --> 00:13:44,519
intelligence issue

298
00:13:48,710 --> 00:13:46,800
as such we are working with industry

299
00:13:50,990 --> 00:13:48,720
Academia and the scientific Community

300
00:13:53,509 --> 00:13:51,000
which bring their own resources ideas

301
00:13:55,129 --> 00:13:53,519
and expertise to this challenging

302
00:13:57,350 --> 00:13:55,139
problem set

303
00:13:59,449 --> 00:13:57,360
robust collaboration and peer review

304
00:14:01,250 --> 00:13:59,459
across a broad range of Partners will

305
00:14:04,310 --> 00:14:01,260
promote greater objectivity and

306
00:14:06,769 --> 00:14:04,320
transparency in the study of UAP

307
00:14:09,170 --> 00:14:06,779
I want to underscore today that only a

308
00:14:11,449 --> 00:14:09,180
very small percentage of UAP reports

309
00:14:14,269 --> 00:14:11,459
display signatures that could reasonably

310
00:14:16,490 --> 00:14:14,279
be described as anomalous the majority

311
00:14:18,650 --> 00:14:16,500
of unidentified objects reported to

312
00:14:21,050 --> 00:14:18,660
Arrow demonstrate mundane

313
00:14:23,389 --> 00:14:21,060
characteristics of balloons unmanned

314
00:14:26,210 --> 00:14:23,399
aerial systems clutter natural phenomena

315
00:14:28,430 --> 00:14:26,220
other readily explainable sources

316
00:14:30,889 --> 00:14:28,440
while a large number of cases in our

317
00:14:33,829 --> 00:14:30,899
Holdings remain technically unresolved

318
00:14:36,110 --> 00:14:33,839
this is primarily due to a lack of data

319
00:14:38,329 --> 00:14:36,120
associated with those cases without

320
00:14:40,310 --> 00:14:38,339
sufficient data we are unable to reach

321
00:14:42,949 --> 00:14:40,320
defendable conclusions

322
00:14:45,170 --> 00:14:42,959
that meet the high scientific standards

323
00:14:47,210 --> 00:14:45,180
we set for resolution and I will not

324
00:14:48,829 --> 00:14:47,220
close a case that I cannot defend the

325
00:14:50,689 --> 00:14:48,839
conclusions of

326
00:14:53,030 --> 00:14:50,699
I recognize that this answer is

327
00:14:54,769 --> 00:14:53,040
unsatisfying to those who in good faith

328
00:14:56,569 --> 00:14:54,779
assume that what they see with their

329
00:14:58,910 --> 00:14:56,579
eyes with their cameras and what their

330
00:15:00,590 --> 00:14:58,920
Radars is incontrovertible evidence of

331
00:15:01,670 --> 00:15:00,600
extraordinary characteristics and

332
00:15:03,470 --> 00:15:01,680
performance

333
00:15:05,629 --> 00:15:03,480
yet time and again with sufficient

334
00:15:08,290 --> 00:15:05,639
scientific quality data it is fact that

335
00:15:11,870 --> 00:15:08,300
UAP often but not always

336
00:15:13,970 --> 00:15:11,880
resolve into readily explainable sources

337
00:15:15,949 --> 00:15:13,980
humans are subject to deception and

338
00:15:18,410 --> 00:15:15,959
Illusions sensors to unexpected

339
00:15:20,750 --> 00:15:18,420
responses and malfunctions and in some

340
00:15:22,730 --> 00:15:20,760
cases intentional interference

341
00:15:24,530 --> 00:15:22,740
getting to the handful of cases that

342
00:15:25,970 --> 00:15:24,540
pass this level of scrutiny is the

343
00:15:28,310 --> 00:15:25,980
mission of era

344
00:15:30,230 --> 00:15:28,320
that is not to say that UAP once

345
00:15:32,509 --> 00:15:30,240
resolved they're no longer of National

346
00:15:34,790 --> 00:15:32,519
Security interest however on the

347
00:15:37,069 --> 00:15:34,800
contrary learning that a UAP isn't of

348
00:15:39,769 --> 00:15:37,079
exotic origin but is instead just a

349
00:15:41,269 --> 00:15:39,779
quadcopter or balloon leads to the

350
00:15:44,030 --> 00:15:41,279
question of who is operating that

351
00:15:45,829 --> 00:15:44,040
quadcopter into what purpose

352
00:15:47,990 --> 00:15:45,839
the answers to those questions will

353
00:15:50,389 --> 00:15:48,000
inform potential National Security or

354
00:15:52,189 --> 00:15:50,399
law enforcement responses

355
00:15:53,810 --> 00:15:52,199
arrow is a member of the Department's

356
00:15:55,910 --> 00:15:53,820
support to the administration's tiger

357
00:15:58,009 --> 00:15:55,920
team effort to deal with stratospheric

358
00:15:59,389 --> 00:15:58,019
objects such as the PRC high altitude

359
00:16:02,569 --> 00:15:59,399
balloon

360
00:16:05,269 --> 00:16:02,579
well when previously unknown objects are

361
00:16:07,370 --> 00:16:05,279
successfully identified it is Arrow's

362
00:16:10,069 --> 00:16:07,380
role too quickly and efficiently hand

363
00:16:12,170 --> 00:16:10,079
off such readily explainable objects to

364
00:16:13,970 --> 00:16:12,180
the intelligence law enforcement or

365
00:16:16,970 --> 00:16:13,980
operational safety communities for

366
00:16:19,069 --> 00:16:16,980
further analysis and appropriate action

367
00:16:22,310 --> 00:16:19,079
in other words Arrow's mission is to

368
00:16:24,410 --> 00:16:22,320
turn UAP into SCP somebody else's

369
00:16:27,110 --> 00:16:24,420
problem

370
00:16:28,910 --> 00:16:27,120
the U.S government the dod and the IC in

371
00:16:31,069 --> 00:16:28,920
particular has tremendous capabilities

372
00:16:34,430 --> 00:16:31,079
to deal with those encountered objects

373
00:16:35,990 --> 00:16:34,440
in the wake of the PRC Hab event the

374
00:16:37,970 --> 00:16:36,000
interagency is working to better

375
00:16:38,769 --> 00:16:37,980
integrate and share information to

376
00:16:41,930 --> 00:16:38,779
address

377
00:16:44,269 --> 00:16:41,940
identifiable stratospheric objects but

378
00:16:46,610 --> 00:16:44,279
that is not all arrows Lane

379
00:16:49,189 --> 00:16:46,620
meanwhile for the few cases in all

380
00:16:50,870 --> 00:16:49,199
domains space air and sea

381
00:16:53,090 --> 00:16:50,880
that do demonstrate potentially

382
00:16:55,610 --> 00:16:53,100
anomalous characteristics Arrow exists

383
00:16:57,949 --> 00:16:55,620
to help the dod IC and interagency

384
00:17:00,410 --> 00:16:57,959
resolve those anomalous cases

385
00:17:01,910 --> 00:17:00,420
in doing so arrow is approaching these

386
00:17:04,789 --> 00:17:01,920
cases with the highest level of

387
00:17:06,470 --> 00:17:04,799
objectivity and analytic rigor this

388
00:17:08,030 --> 00:17:06,480
includes physically testing and

389
00:17:10,789 --> 00:17:08,040
employing modeling and simulation

390
00:17:12,590 --> 00:17:10,799
validate our analyzes and underlying

391
00:17:14,169 --> 00:17:12,600
theories then peer reviewing those

392
00:17:16,370 --> 00:17:14,179
results within the US government

393
00:17:18,409 --> 00:17:16,380
industry partners and appropriately

394
00:17:20,689 --> 00:17:18,419
cleared academic institutions before

395
00:17:22,610 --> 00:17:20,699
reaching any conclusions

396
00:17:24,829 --> 00:17:22,620
I should also State clearly for the

397
00:17:27,230 --> 00:17:24,839
record that in our research Arrow has

398
00:17:29,390 --> 00:17:27,240
found no credible evidence thus far of

399
00:17:32,090 --> 00:17:29,400
extraterrestrial activity off-world

400
00:17:33,710 --> 00:17:32,100
technology or objects that defy the

401
00:17:36,169 --> 00:17:33,720
known laws of physics

402
00:17:38,570 --> 00:17:36,179
in the event sufficient scientific data

403
00:17:40,610 --> 00:17:38,580
were ever obtained that a UAP

404
00:17:43,070 --> 00:17:40,620
encountered can only be explained by

405
00:17:44,930 --> 00:17:43,080
extraterrestrial origin we are committed

406
00:17:47,690 --> 00:17:44,940
to working with our interagency partners

407
00:17:50,150 --> 00:17:47,700
at Nasa to appropriately inform U.S

408
00:17:52,730 --> 00:17:50,160
government's leadership of its findings

409
00:17:54,470 --> 00:17:52,740
for those few cases that have leaked to

410
00:17:56,870 --> 00:17:54,480
the public previously and subsequently

411
00:17:58,549 --> 00:17:56,880
commented on by the U.S government I

412
00:18:00,289 --> 00:17:58,559
encourage those who hold alternative

413
00:18:02,390 --> 00:18:00,299
theories or views to submit your

414
00:18:04,669 --> 00:18:02,400
research to Credible peer-reviewed

415
00:18:06,470 --> 00:18:04,679
scientific journals arrow is working

416
00:18:09,470 --> 00:18:06,480
very hard to do the same

417
00:18:10,789 --> 00:18:09,480
that is how science works not by blog or

418
00:18:12,830 --> 00:18:10,799
social media

419
00:18:15,470 --> 00:18:12,840
we know that there is tremendous public

420
00:18:18,710 --> 00:18:15,480
interest in UAP and a desire for answers

421
00:18:21,289 --> 00:18:18,720
from Arrow by its very nature the UAP

422
00:18:23,810 --> 00:18:21,299
challenge has for decades lent itself to

423
00:18:26,930 --> 00:18:23,820
mystery sensationalism and even

424
00:18:29,330 --> 00:18:26,940
conspiracy for that reason Arrow remains

425
00:18:31,430 --> 00:18:29,340
committed to transparency accountability

426
00:18:34,190 --> 00:18:31,440
and to sharing as much with the American

427
00:18:36,289 --> 00:18:34,200
public as we can consistent with Our

428
00:18:38,930 --> 00:18:36,299
obligation to protect and not only

429
00:18:41,090 --> 00:18:38,940
intelligence sources and methods but U.S

430
00:18:43,970 --> 00:18:41,100
and Allied capabilities

431
00:18:46,310 --> 00:18:43,980
however Arrow's work will take time if

432
00:18:48,529 --> 00:18:46,320
we are committed to do it right it means

433
00:18:49,850 --> 00:18:48,539
adhering to the scientific method and

434
00:18:52,909 --> 00:18:49,860
the highest standards of research

435
00:18:55,130 --> 00:18:52,919
Integrity it means being methodical and

436
00:18:57,529 --> 00:18:55,140
scrupulous it means withholding judgment

437
00:18:59,690 --> 00:18:57,539
in favor of evidence it means following

438
00:19:02,210 --> 00:18:59,700
the data where it leads wherever it

439
00:19:04,250 --> 00:19:02,220
leads it means establishing scientific

440
00:19:05,930 --> 00:19:04,260
peer-reviewed theoretical underpinnings

441
00:19:08,330 --> 00:19:05,940
of observed data

442
00:19:09,470 --> 00:19:08,340
an arrow is committed to all of those

443
00:19:11,390 --> 00:19:09,480
standards

444
00:19:14,270 --> 00:19:11,400
I'm proud of Arrow's progress over the

445
00:19:16,669 --> 00:19:14,280
last nine months months much remains to

446
00:19:19,010 --> 00:19:16,679
be done but the hard work is underway

447
00:19:20,810 --> 00:19:19,020
thank you for your continued support and

448
00:19:22,909 --> 00:19:20,820
before we turn to questions I'm going to

449
00:19:24,710 --> 00:19:22,919
walk you through some of our analytical

450
00:19:29,210 --> 00:19:24,720
Trends in a couple of cases that we've

451
00:19:36,049 --> 00:19:32,049
so one of the things that Arrow does is

452
00:19:38,750 --> 00:19:36,059
high integrity analysis as I've said

453
00:19:42,770 --> 00:19:38,760
this chart represents

454
00:19:45,650 --> 00:19:42,780
the trend analysis of all the cases in

455
00:19:48,529 --> 00:19:45,660
arrows Holdings right to date

456
00:19:51,289 --> 00:19:48,539
what you'll see on the left is a

457
00:19:55,090 --> 00:19:51,299
histogram of all of our reported

458
00:20:00,529 --> 00:19:55,100
sightings as a function of altitude

459
00:20:01,850 --> 00:20:00,539
so most of our sightings occur in the 15

460
00:20:04,250 --> 00:20:01,860
to 25

461
00:20:05,570 --> 00:20:04,260
000 foot range and that is ultimately

462
00:20:07,909 --> 00:20:05,580
because that's where a lot of our

463
00:20:10,909 --> 00:20:07,919
aircraft are

464
00:20:14,090 --> 00:20:10,919
on the far right upper corner you'll see

465
00:20:17,090 --> 00:20:14,100
a breakout of the morphologies of all of

466
00:20:19,850 --> 00:20:17,100
the UAP that are reported over half

467
00:20:25,250 --> 00:20:19,860
about 52 percent of what's been reported

468
00:20:27,590 --> 00:20:25,260
to us are round orb spheres

469
00:20:29,750 --> 00:20:27,600
the rest of those break out into all

470
00:20:31,510 --> 00:20:29,760
kinds of different other shapes the gray

471
00:20:34,850 --> 00:20:31,520
box is

472
00:20:37,070 --> 00:20:34,860
essentially there's no data on what its

473
00:20:39,710 --> 00:20:37,080
shape is either it wasn't reported or

474
00:20:43,370 --> 00:20:39,720
the sensor did not collect it

475
00:20:45,950 --> 00:20:43,380
the bottom map is a heat map of all

476
00:20:48,409 --> 00:20:45,960
reporting areas across the globe that we

477
00:20:51,289 --> 00:20:48,419
have available to us

478
00:20:54,049 --> 00:20:51,299
what you'll notice is that there is a

479
00:20:57,250 --> 00:20:54,059
heavy what we call collection bias both

480
00:21:01,070 --> 00:20:57,260
in altitude and in geographic location

481
00:21:03,110 --> 00:21:01,080
that's where all of our sensors exist

482
00:21:04,909 --> 00:21:03,120
that's where our training ranges are

483
00:21:08,510 --> 00:21:04,919
that's where our operational ranges are

484
00:21:11,330 --> 00:21:08,520
that's where all of our platforms are

485
00:21:15,010 --> 00:21:11,340
in the middle what we have done is

486
00:21:19,730 --> 00:21:15,020
reduce the most typically reported UAP

487
00:21:22,669 --> 00:21:19,740
characteristics to these fields mostly

488
00:21:25,250 --> 00:21:22,679
round mostly one to four meters white

489
00:21:28,190 --> 00:21:25,260
silver translucent metallic

490
00:21:30,409 --> 00:21:28,200
ten thousand thirty thousand feet

491
00:21:33,529 --> 00:21:30,419
with apparent velocities from the

492
00:21:36,289 --> 00:21:33,539
stationary to Mach 2. no thermal

493
00:21:39,049 --> 00:21:36,299
exhausts usually detected we get

494
00:21:42,110 --> 00:21:39,059
intermittent radar returns we get

495
00:21:44,630 --> 00:21:42,120
intermittent radio returns and we get

496
00:21:47,090 --> 00:21:44,640
intermittent thermal signatures

497
00:21:50,390 --> 00:21:47,100
that's what we're looking for and trying

498
00:21:50,400 --> 00:21:53,630
next slide

499
00:21:59,590 --> 00:21:55,970
so I'm going to walk you through two

500
00:22:03,350 --> 00:21:59,600
cases that we've Declassified recently

501
00:22:06,649 --> 00:22:03,360
this first one is an MQ-9 in the Middle

502
00:22:09,770 --> 00:22:06,659
East observing that blow up which is an

503
00:22:13,250 --> 00:22:09,780
apparent spherical object vo EO sensors

504
00:22:17,870 --> 00:22:14,630
if you want to go ahead and click that

505
00:22:22,310 --> 00:22:20,210
you'll see it come through the top of

506
00:22:25,610 --> 00:22:22,320
the screen there it goes and then the

507
00:22:27,710 --> 00:22:25,620
camera will slew to follow it

508
00:22:29,930 --> 00:22:27,720
you'll see it pop in and out of the

509
00:22:32,390 --> 00:22:29,940
screw field of view there

510
00:22:34,190 --> 00:22:32,400
this is essentially all of the data we

511
00:22:37,190 --> 00:22:34,200
have associated with this event from

512
00:22:42,049 --> 00:22:39,169
it is going to be virtually impossible

513
00:22:44,270 --> 00:22:42,059
to fully identify that

514
00:22:46,549 --> 00:22:44,280
just based off of that video

515
00:22:50,210 --> 00:22:46,559
now what we can do and what we are doing

516
00:22:53,090 --> 00:22:50,220
is keeping that as part of that

517
00:22:56,029 --> 00:22:53,100
group of 52 percent

518
00:22:58,130 --> 00:22:56,039
to see what are the similarities what

519
00:23:00,169 --> 00:22:58,140
are the trends across all these do we

520
00:23:02,990 --> 00:23:00,179
see these in a particular distribution

521
00:23:05,630 --> 00:23:03,000
do they all behave the same or not

522
00:23:07,610 --> 00:23:05,640
as we get more data

523
00:23:10,490 --> 00:23:07,620
we will be able to go back and look at

524
00:23:13,130 --> 00:23:10,500
these in a fuller context

525
00:23:15,409 --> 00:23:13,140
how are we going to get more data we are

526
00:23:17,450 --> 00:23:15,419
working with the joint staff to issue

527
00:23:20,510 --> 00:23:17,460
guidance to all the services and

528
00:23:22,130 --> 00:23:20,520
commands that will then establish what

529
00:23:24,230 --> 00:23:22,140
are the reporting requirements the

530
00:23:26,510 --> 00:23:24,240
timeliness and all of the data that is

531
00:23:30,470 --> 00:23:26,520
required to be delivered to us and

532
00:23:32,510 --> 00:23:30,480
retained from all the associated sensors

533
00:23:34,610 --> 00:23:32,520
that historically hasn't been the case

534
00:23:36,950 --> 00:23:34,620
and it's been happenstance that data has

535
00:23:39,890 --> 00:23:36,960
been collected

536
00:23:44,390 --> 00:23:39,900
next slide

537
00:23:47,870 --> 00:23:44,400
this particular event South Asia MQ-9

538
00:23:50,210 --> 00:23:47,880
looking at another MQ-9 and what's

539
00:23:53,149 --> 00:23:50,220
highlighted there in that red circle is

540
00:23:55,669 --> 00:23:53,159
an object that flies through the screen

541
00:23:57,590 --> 00:23:55,679
unlike the previous one

542
00:23:59,270 --> 00:23:57,600
this one actually shows some really

543
00:24:02,330 --> 00:23:59,280
interesting things that everyone thought

544
00:24:04,549 --> 00:24:02,340
was truly anomalous to start with first

545
00:24:06,830 --> 00:24:04,559
of all it's a high speed object that's

546
00:24:10,909 --> 00:24:06,840
flying in the field of regard of two

547
00:24:13,250 --> 00:24:10,919
mq-9s second it appears to have this

548
00:24:15,649 --> 00:24:13,260
trail behind it

549
00:24:19,430 --> 00:24:15,659
all right which at first blush you would

550
00:24:23,210 --> 00:24:19,440
think that looks like a propulsion Trail

551
00:24:25,010 --> 00:24:23,220
in reality if you want to play the first

552
00:24:27,529 --> 00:24:25,020
slide we'll show you what that looks

553
00:24:30,950 --> 00:24:27,539
like in real time or first video so

554
00:24:32,870 --> 00:24:30,960
we're looking at that there it goes

555
00:24:34,730 --> 00:24:32,880
once you play it again and then pause it

556
00:24:36,350 --> 00:24:34,740
halfway through

557
00:24:38,029 --> 00:24:36,360
right there

558
00:24:40,850 --> 00:24:38,039
all right if you might be able to see

559
00:24:43,490 --> 00:24:40,860
that trail there behind it

560
00:24:46,570 --> 00:24:43,500
that's actually not a real trail that is

561
00:24:49,070 --> 00:24:46,580
a sensor artifact

562
00:24:51,289 --> 00:24:49,080
each one of those little blobs is

563
00:24:53,510 --> 00:24:51,299
actually a representation of the object

564
00:24:56,149 --> 00:24:53,520
as it's moving through and later in the

565
00:25:00,529 --> 00:24:56,159
video as the

566
00:25:03,049 --> 00:25:00,539
as the camera slews that trail actually

567
00:25:07,010 --> 00:25:03,059
follows the direction of the camera not

568
00:25:09,470 --> 00:25:07,020
the direction of the object

569
00:25:11,210 --> 00:25:09,480
we pulled these apart frame by frame we

570
00:25:13,149 --> 00:25:11,220
were able to demonstrate that that is

571
00:25:15,529 --> 00:25:13,159
essentially a readout

572
00:25:18,049 --> 00:25:15,539
overlap of the image it's a it's a

573
00:25:20,049 --> 00:25:18,059
shadow image right it's not real

574
00:25:23,149 --> 00:25:20,059
further if you later

575
00:25:26,210 --> 00:25:23,159
follow this all the way to end it starts

576
00:25:28,070 --> 00:25:26,220
to resolve itself into that blob that's

577
00:25:30,289 --> 00:25:28,080
in that picture in the top of the right

578
00:25:32,090 --> 00:25:30,299
and if you squint it looks like an

579
00:25:33,830 --> 00:25:32,100
aircraft because it actually turns out

580
00:25:36,769 --> 00:25:33,840
to be an aircraft go ahead and put that

581
00:25:41,690 --> 00:25:39,230
so you'll see the tail sort of pop out

582
00:25:44,090 --> 00:25:41,700
there and so what you're looking at is

583
00:25:46,130 --> 00:25:44,100
this is in the infrared this is the Heat

584
00:25:48,350 --> 00:25:46,140
Signature off of the

585
00:25:50,269 --> 00:25:48,360
engines of a commuter aircraft that

586
00:25:53,810 --> 00:25:50,279
happen to be flying in the vicinity of

587
00:25:56,330 --> 00:25:53,820
where those two mq9s were at

588
00:25:57,769 --> 00:25:56,340
why am i showing you this so the first

589
00:26:00,710 --> 00:25:57,779
one that I showed you we don't have

590
00:26:04,130 --> 00:26:00,720
resolved yet right that is an unresolved

591
00:26:06,950 --> 00:26:04,140
case we are still studying this one we

592
00:26:08,990 --> 00:26:06,960
can resolve but this is the kind of data

593
00:26:11,630 --> 00:26:09,000
that we have to work with and the type

594
00:26:13,669 --> 00:26:11,640
of analysis that we have to do which can

595
00:26:16,549 --> 00:26:13,679
be quite extensive when you have to pull

596
00:26:19,490 --> 00:26:16,559
these apart frame by frame

597
00:26:22,490 --> 00:26:19,500
further we're now matching all of this

598
00:26:25,789 --> 00:26:22,500
with the models of all of those Imaging

599
00:26:28,310 --> 00:26:25,799
sensors so that I can say I can recreate

600
00:26:30,110 --> 00:26:28,320
this I can actually show how the sensor

601
00:26:32,390 --> 00:26:30,120
is going to respond

602
00:26:35,510 --> 00:26:32,400
all of these sensors don't necessarily

603
00:26:37,549 --> 00:26:35,520
respond the way you think they do

604
00:26:41,029 --> 00:26:37,559
especially out in the world and in the

605
00:26:45,110 --> 00:26:42,710
and I believe that's all I have and I

606
00:26:48,289 --> 00:26:45,120
will open it up for years of questions

607
00:26:50,630 --> 00:26:48,299
thank you so much Dr crew Patrick can

608
00:26:54,769 --> 00:26:50,640
you just give us some raw numbers of how

609
00:26:56,390 --> 00:26:54,779
many uaps you've analyzed how many have

610
00:26:58,190 --> 00:26:56,400
been resolved and sort of in what

611
00:27:00,490 --> 00:26:58,200
buckets and then how many are still left

612
00:27:03,830 --> 00:27:00,500
to be resolved just an update from your

613
00:27:06,909 --> 00:27:03,840
January public report where it was 366

614
00:27:09,590 --> 00:27:06,919
or something in about 150 were were

615
00:27:11,269 --> 00:27:09,600
balloons in about two dozen were drones

616
00:27:15,409 --> 00:27:11,279
you know just give us an update if you

617
00:27:21,110 --> 00:27:15,419
have one sure so as of this week we are

618
00:27:24,590 --> 00:27:21,120
tracking over a total of 650 cases

619
00:27:26,630 --> 00:27:24,600
now the report in January basically said

620
00:27:29,570 --> 00:27:26,640
about half of the ones at that time

621
00:27:31,909 --> 00:27:29,580
about 150 were balloon were likely

622
00:27:34,730 --> 00:27:31,919
balloon-like or something like that that

623
00:27:36,710 --> 00:27:34,740
doesn't mean they're resolved so what

624
00:27:40,190 --> 00:27:36,720
let me when we walk everyone through

625
00:27:42,289 --> 00:27:40,200
what our analytic process looks like

626
00:27:45,289 --> 00:27:42,299
we have a essentially a

627
00:27:47,750 --> 00:27:45,299
five-step process right so we have we

628
00:27:52,549 --> 00:27:47,760
get our cases in with all the data we

629
00:27:56,149 --> 00:27:52,559
create a case uh for that event

630
00:27:59,029 --> 00:27:56,159
my team does a preliminary scrub of all

631
00:28:01,610 --> 00:27:59,039
of those cases as they come in just to

632
00:28:04,370 --> 00:28:01,620
sort out do we have any information that

633
00:28:06,409 --> 00:28:04,380
says this is in one of those likely

634
00:28:09,890 --> 00:28:06,419
categories it's likely a balloon it's

635
00:28:11,210 --> 00:28:09,900
likely a balloon a bird it's likely some

636
00:28:14,029 --> 00:28:11,220
other object

637
00:28:18,110 --> 00:28:14,039
or we don't know

638
00:28:20,870 --> 00:28:18,120
then we prioritize those based off of

639
00:28:22,789 --> 00:28:20,880
where they are are they attached to a

640
00:28:25,810 --> 00:28:22,799
national security area

641
00:28:28,669 --> 00:28:25,820
does it show some anomalous

642
00:28:30,649 --> 00:28:28,679
phenomenology that is of interest if

643
00:28:33,350 --> 00:28:30,659
it's just if it's just a spherical thing

644
00:28:35,990 --> 00:28:33,360
that's floating around with the with the

645
00:28:37,370 --> 00:28:36,000
wind and it has no payload on it that's

646
00:28:39,289 --> 00:28:37,380
going to be less important than

647
00:28:40,669 --> 00:28:39,299
something that has a payload on it which

648
00:28:42,110 --> 00:28:40,679
would be less important than something

649
00:28:44,149 --> 00:28:42,120
that's maneuvering

650
00:28:46,370 --> 00:28:44,159
right so there's there's sort of a

651
00:28:50,330 --> 00:28:46,380
hierarchy of just binning the priorities

652
00:28:52,730 --> 00:28:50,340
because we can't do all of them at once

653
00:28:54,590 --> 00:28:52,740
once we do that and we prioritize them

654
00:28:57,110 --> 00:28:54,600
when we take that package of data in

655
00:28:59,510 --> 00:28:57,120
that case and I have set up two teams

656
00:29:02,029 --> 00:28:59,520
I'll think of this as a red team blue

657
00:29:04,130 --> 00:29:02,039
team or a competitive analysis

658
00:29:07,190 --> 00:29:04,140
I have an intelligence Community team

659
00:29:10,070 --> 00:29:07,200
made up of intelligence analysts and I

660
00:29:11,390 --> 00:29:10,080
have an s t team made up of scientists

661
00:29:13,310 --> 00:29:11,400
and engineers and the people that

662
00:29:15,289 --> 00:29:13,320
actually build a lot of these sensors or

663
00:29:18,289 --> 00:29:15,299
physicists because you know if you're a

664
00:29:19,130 --> 00:29:18,299
physicist you can do anything right

665
00:29:22,310 --> 00:29:19,140
um

666
00:29:24,769 --> 00:29:22,320
and but they're not associated with the

667
00:29:26,930 --> 00:29:24,779
Intel Community they're not Intel

668
00:29:29,090 --> 00:29:26,940
officers so they they look at this

669
00:29:31,430 --> 00:29:29,100
through the lens of the sensor of the

670
00:29:34,549 --> 00:29:31,440
what the data says we give that package

671
00:29:35,930 --> 00:29:34,559
to both teams the intelligence Community

672
00:29:38,029 --> 00:29:35,940
is going to look at it through the lens

673
00:29:40,549 --> 00:29:38,039
of the intelligence record and and what

674
00:29:42,889 --> 00:29:40,559
they assess and their Intel tradecraft

675
00:29:44,630 --> 00:29:42,899
which they have very specific rules and

676
00:29:46,789 --> 00:29:44,640
regulations on how they do that

677
00:29:48,470 --> 00:29:46,799
scientific Community Technical Community

678
00:29:50,870 --> 00:29:48,480
is going to look at it through the lens

679
00:29:53,630 --> 00:29:50,880
of what is the data telling me what is

680
00:29:55,730 --> 00:29:53,640
the sensor doing what would I expect a

681
00:29:58,669 --> 00:29:55,740
sense of response to be

682
00:30:03,049 --> 00:29:58,679
and back that out those two groups give

683
00:30:06,230 --> 00:30:03,059
us their answers we then adjudicate

684
00:30:08,570 --> 00:30:06,240
if they agree then I am more likely to

685
00:30:11,269 --> 00:30:08,580
close that case if they agree on what it

686
00:30:13,070 --> 00:30:11,279
is if they disagree we will have an

687
00:30:14,630 --> 00:30:13,080
adjudication we'll bring them together

688
00:30:17,870 --> 00:30:14,640
we'll take a look at the differences

689
00:30:19,430 --> 00:30:17,880
we'll adjudicate what why do you say one

690
00:30:21,710 --> 00:30:19,440
thing and you say another

691
00:30:24,590 --> 00:30:21,720
we will then come to a case

692
00:30:27,049 --> 00:30:24,600
recommendation

693
00:30:30,289 --> 00:30:27,059
that'll get written up by my team

694
00:30:32,210 --> 00:30:30,299
that then goes to a senior technical

695
00:30:34,070 --> 00:30:32,220
Advisory Group

696
00:30:37,549 --> 00:30:34,080
which is outside of all of those people

697
00:30:38,470 --> 00:30:37,559
made up of senior technical folks and

698
00:30:45,549 --> 00:30:38,480
and

699
00:30:48,470 --> 00:30:45,559
retired out of the community

700
00:30:52,909 --> 00:30:48,480
and they they essentially peer review

701
00:30:54,830 --> 00:30:52,919
what that case recommendation is

702
00:30:57,529 --> 00:30:54,840
they write their recommendations that

703
00:30:59,389 --> 00:30:57,539
comes back to me I review it we make a

704
00:31:00,350 --> 00:30:59,399
determination and I'll sign off one way

705
00:31:02,750 --> 00:31:00,360
or the other

706
00:31:06,049 --> 00:31:02,760
and then that will go out as the the

707
00:31:08,570 --> 00:31:06,059
case determination once we have an

708
00:31:10,970 --> 00:31:08,580
approved web portal to hang the

709
00:31:12,769 --> 00:31:10,980
unclassified stuff we will D you know we

710
00:31:14,269 --> 00:31:12,779
would downgrade and declassify things

711
00:31:16,430 --> 00:31:14,279
and put it out there

712
00:31:19,610 --> 00:31:16,440
in the meantime we're putting a lot of

713
00:31:21,470 --> 00:31:19,620
these on our classified web portal where

714
00:31:22,850 --> 00:31:21,480
we can then collaborate with the rest of

715
00:31:24,710 --> 00:31:22,860
the community so they can see what's

716
00:31:28,130 --> 00:31:24,720
going on

717
00:31:32,210 --> 00:31:28,140
that's in a nutshell that is the process

718
00:31:36,649 --> 00:31:34,730
because of that

719
00:31:40,370 --> 00:31:36,659
that takes time

720
00:31:42,470 --> 00:31:40,380
so of those over 650 you know we've

721
00:31:47,930 --> 00:31:42,480
prioritized

722
00:31:51,350 --> 00:31:47,940
about uh half of them to be of of

723
00:31:53,029 --> 00:31:51,360
um anomalous interesting value

724
00:31:55,130 --> 00:31:53,039
and now we have to go through those and

725
00:31:58,909 --> 00:31:55,140
go how much do I have actual data for

726
00:32:02,810 --> 00:31:58,919
because if all I have is a is a operator

727
00:32:06,289 --> 00:32:02,820
report that says I saw X Y or Z my

728
00:32:08,810 --> 00:32:06,299
assessment is a b or c that's not really

729
00:32:11,330 --> 00:32:08,820
sufficient that's a good place to start

730
00:32:13,370 --> 00:32:11,340
but I have to have data I have to have

731
00:32:14,930 --> 00:32:13,380
radar data I have to have EO data I have

732
00:32:17,630 --> 00:32:14,940
to have thermal data I have to have

733
00:32:19,310 --> 00:32:17,640
overhead data and we need to look at all

734
00:32:21,950 --> 00:32:19,320
that

735
00:32:23,870 --> 00:32:21,960
now from a big picture perspective I

736
00:32:25,370 --> 00:32:23,880
still have that's all they're still very

737
00:32:27,830 --> 00:32:25,380
valuable data

738
00:32:31,310 --> 00:32:27,840
and we're looking at applying a lot of

739
00:32:34,070 --> 00:32:31,320
things new tools analytic tools like

740
00:32:37,070 --> 00:32:34,080
natural language processing so I can go

741
00:32:39,889 --> 00:32:37,080
across all of those reports and look for

742
00:32:42,409 --> 00:32:39,899
commonalities how many of them are being

743
00:32:43,909 --> 00:32:42,419
described as round spherical objects

744
00:32:45,710 --> 00:32:43,919
that are maneuvering how many of them

745
00:32:50,029 --> 00:32:45,720
are not maneuvering how many of them

746
00:32:52,789 --> 00:32:50,039
seem to have a plume to it or note

747
00:32:54,529 --> 00:32:52,799
that's also going to be very valuable to

748
00:32:57,710 --> 00:32:54,539
give us more of a global picture and a

749
00:33:00,230 --> 00:32:57,720
Trends analysis of what are we saying

750
00:33:03,110 --> 00:33:00,240
and help us get to the determination

751
00:33:03,950 --> 00:33:03,120
so go back to your question ma'am we

752
00:33:05,690 --> 00:33:03,960
have

753
00:33:07,970 --> 00:33:05,700
um

754
00:33:09,889 --> 00:33:07,980
this next quarterly report will be

755
00:33:11,649 --> 00:33:09,899
coming out here pretty soon our next

756
00:33:16,669 --> 00:33:11,659
annual report

757
00:33:18,769 --> 00:33:16,679
you all have given us moved it up to to

758
00:33:21,950 --> 00:33:18,779
June July we're going to be having that

759
00:33:24,409 --> 00:33:21,960
done about that time frame and we will

760
00:33:26,630 --> 00:33:24,419
have a we'll be combining a whole number

761
00:33:30,409 --> 00:33:26,640
of reports into that one

762
00:33:34,549 --> 00:33:30,419
uh I think we're currently sitting at

763
00:33:40,430 --> 00:33:36,830
if I remember correct we were around

764
00:33:42,470 --> 00:33:40,440
20 to 30-ish or about halfway through

765
00:33:44,269 --> 00:33:42,480
that analytic process

766
00:33:45,889 --> 00:33:44,279
a handful of them have made it all the

767
00:33:48,529 --> 00:33:45,899
way out to the other side gone through

768
00:33:50,990 --> 00:33:48,539
peer review we've got case closure

769
00:33:53,630 --> 00:33:51,000
reports done and signed

770
00:33:56,630 --> 00:33:53,640
we're going to get faster as we get more

771
00:33:59,750 --> 00:33:56,640
people on board and we get more of the

772
00:34:03,190 --> 00:33:59,760
community tools to automate some of the

773
00:34:09,109 --> 00:34:06,190
yeah thank you madam chair and Dr

774
00:34:11,930 --> 00:34:09,119
Kirkpatrick the odni annual threat

775
00:34:15,050 --> 00:34:11,940
assessment states that China's space

776
00:34:17,889 --> 00:34:15,060
activities are designed to erode U.S

777
00:34:21,290 --> 00:34:17,899
influence across military technological

778
00:34:23,510 --> 00:34:21,300
economic and diplomatic spheres likewise

779
00:34:26,690 --> 00:34:23,520
Russia will remain a key space

780
00:34:29,030 --> 00:34:26,700
competitor in the course of your work

781
00:34:31,909 --> 00:34:29,040
have you become aware of any Chinese or

782
00:34:35,389 --> 00:34:31,919
Russia technical advancements to surveil

783
00:34:38,329 --> 00:34:35,399
or attack U.S interests

784
00:34:40,849 --> 00:34:38,339
so that's a great question part of what

785
00:34:43,810 --> 00:34:40,859
we have to do as we go through these

786
00:34:46,010 --> 00:34:43,820
especially the ones that show

787
00:34:48,889 --> 00:34:46,020
signatures of advanced technical

788
00:34:51,470 --> 00:34:48,899
capabilities is determine if there's a

789
00:34:54,710 --> 00:34:51,480
foreign Nexus

790
00:34:57,230 --> 00:34:54,720
that's really hard if what we observe

791
00:34:59,750 --> 00:34:57,240
doesn't have a Chinese or Russian flag

792
00:35:01,670 --> 00:34:59,760
on the side of it

793
00:35:03,589 --> 00:35:01,680
now

794
00:35:04,190 --> 00:35:03,599
I think it is

795
00:35:06,530 --> 00:35:04,200
um

796
00:35:11,870 --> 00:35:06,540
prudent to say

797
00:35:13,849 --> 00:35:11,880
of the of the cases that are showing

798
00:35:16,069 --> 00:35:13,859
it you know some sort of advanced

799
00:35:18,410 --> 00:35:16,079
technical signature of which we're

800
00:35:22,250 --> 00:35:18,420
talking single percentages of the entire

801
00:35:24,349 --> 00:35:22,260
population of cases we have

802
00:35:26,390 --> 00:35:24,359
um I am concerned

803
00:35:29,690 --> 00:35:26,400
about

804
00:35:32,150 --> 00:35:29,700
what that Nexus is and I have indicators

805
00:35:34,370 --> 00:35:32,160
that some are related to foreign

806
00:35:37,310 --> 00:35:34,380
capabilities

807
00:35:38,690 --> 00:35:37,320
we have to investigate that with our IC

808
00:35:41,329 --> 00:35:38,700
partners

809
00:35:43,430 --> 00:35:41,339
and as we get evidence to support that

810
00:35:47,510 --> 00:35:43,440
that gets then handed off to the

811
00:35:50,089 --> 00:35:47,520
appropriate IC agency to investigate

812
00:35:52,670 --> 00:35:50,099
again it becomes an SCP at that point

813
00:35:57,410 --> 00:35:52,680
yeah somebody else's problem right very

814
00:35:59,930 --> 00:35:57,420
good thank you yes is it is it is it

815
00:36:02,450 --> 00:35:59,940
possible that the Chinese or Russian

816
00:36:04,310 --> 00:36:02,460
Advanced Technologies could could be

817
00:36:07,609 --> 00:36:04,320
causing some of these anomalous

818
00:36:10,690 --> 00:36:07,619
behaviors and and you said there seems

819
00:36:14,870 --> 00:36:10,700
to be some indicators

820
00:36:17,390 --> 00:36:14,880
so just for us today could you describe

821
00:36:22,550 --> 00:36:17,400
Potential Threat that might exist out

822
00:36:24,650 --> 00:36:22,560
there if they are foreign sure Nexus

823
00:36:26,569 --> 00:36:24,660
in order to do this research

824
00:36:30,589 --> 00:36:26,579
appropriately

825
00:36:32,030 --> 00:36:30,599
we have to also be cognizant of what is

826
00:36:35,690 --> 00:36:32,040
the state of the art and Development

827
00:36:37,609 --> 00:36:35,700
Across the s t Community what is what

828
00:36:41,230 --> 00:36:37,619
are the darpas of the world doing what

829
00:36:44,390 --> 00:36:41,240
are our What's the horizon scanning of

830
00:36:45,950 --> 00:36:44,400
emerging Technologies appropriate to

831
00:36:48,470 --> 00:36:45,960
this subcommittee

832
00:36:50,089 --> 00:36:48,480
what is happening out there and if

833
00:36:52,550 --> 00:36:50,099
somebody could accelerate that

834
00:36:54,290 --> 00:36:52,560
capability how would that manifest

835
00:36:56,390 --> 00:36:54,300
itself and what would it look like and

836
00:36:58,089 --> 00:36:56,400
do those signatures match what we're

837
00:37:01,310 --> 00:36:58,099
seeing

838
00:37:05,870 --> 00:37:01,320
there are emerging capabilities out

839
00:37:08,690 --> 00:37:05,880
there that that in many instances

840
00:37:10,550 --> 00:37:08,700
Russia and China well China in

841
00:37:14,450 --> 00:37:10,560
particular are

842
00:37:17,089 --> 00:37:14,460
on par or ahead of us in some areas

843
00:37:19,069 --> 00:37:17,099
all right so previously I used to be the

844
00:37:20,630 --> 00:37:19,079
defense Department's intelligence

845
00:37:23,150 --> 00:37:20,640
officer for Science and Technical

846
00:37:26,510 --> 00:37:23,160
intelligence that was our job was to

847
00:37:29,510 --> 00:37:26,520
look for what does all that look like

848
00:37:31,970 --> 00:37:29,520
um and then you know my last several

849
00:37:35,410 --> 00:37:31,980
years of course in in space command

850
00:37:42,050 --> 00:37:40,190
the the adversary is not

851
00:37:44,089 --> 00:37:42,060
waiting

852
00:37:45,589 --> 00:37:44,099
they are advancing and they're advancing

853
00:37:47,690 --> 00:37:45,599
quickly

854
00:37:49,250 --> 00:37:47,700
if I were to put on some of my old hats

855
00:37:52,970 --> 00:37:49,260
I would tell you

856
00:37:56,030 --> 00:37:52,980
they are less risk-averse at technical

857
00:37:57,890 --> 00:37:56,040
advancement than we are

858
00:37:59,930 --> 00:37:57,900
right they are just willing to try

859
00:38:01,910 --> 00:37:59,940
things and see if it works

860
00:38:04,790 --> 00:38:01,920
are there capabilities that could be

861
00:38:07,130 --> 00:38:04,800
employed against us in both an ISR and a

862
00:38:09,410 --> 00:38:07,140
weapons fashion absolutely

863
00:38:12,190 --> 00:38:09,420
do I have evidence that they're doing it

864
00:38:17,390 --> 00:38:12,200
in these cases

865
00:38:21,950 --> 00:38:19,430
thank you I appreciate that and that's

866
00:38:23,390 --> 00:38:21,960
that is why it's so important that you

867
00:38:25,310 --> 00:38:23,400
are working with the intelligence

868
00:38:27,410 --> 00:38:25,320
Community as well

869
00:38:30,410 --> 00:38:27,420
um because you you have the science the

870
00:38:34,069 --> 00:38:30,420
data background but you also need to

871
00:38:36,470 --> 00:38:34,079
know from various sources what

872
00:38:37,310 --> 00:38:36,480
adversaries may be working on is that

873
00:38:39,410 --> 00:38:37,320
correct

874
00:38:42,109 --> 00:38:39,420
thank you thank you very much thank you

875
00:38:44,270 --> 00:38:42,119
madam chair senator

876
00:38:46,490 --> 00:38:44,280
uh well thank you chair gillibrand

877
00:38:48,470 --> 00:38:46,500
ranking member Ernst this is a really

878
00:38:51,109 --> 00:38:48,480
important hearing I'd like to thank you

879
00:38:53,630 --> 00:38:51,119
Dr Kirkpatrick for your service to the

880
00:38:56,569 --> 00:38:53,640
country and as a former systems analyst

881
00:38:58,730 --> 00:38:56,579
myself I really appreciate your flow

882
00:39:00,770 --> 00:38:58,740
chart the description of the process and

883
00:39:03,170 --> 00:39:00,780
particularly the trends analysis going

884
00:39:05,150 --> 00:39:03,180
forward how that's going to help us and

885
00:39:07,370 --> 00:39:05,160
you've talked about language the large

886
00:39:08,990 --> 00:39:07,380
llms the large language models of

887
00:39:10,630 --> 00:39:09,000
artificial intelligence that's really

888
00:39:13,329 --> 00:39:10,640
going to help us in the hunt forward

889
00:39:16,490 --> 00:39:13,339
predictive analysis I think

890
00:39:17,810 --> 00:39:16,500
to some of your point what we're worried

891
00:39:20,569 --> 00:39:17,820
about but I want to focus on Nevada

892
00:39:23,810 --> 00:39:20,579
because I want to talk about the impact

893
00:39:26,150 --> 00:39:23,820
of uaps on Aviation safety so when it

894
00:39:29,089 --> 00:39:26,160
comes to unified unidentified aerial

895
00:39:30,530 --> 00:39:29,099
phenomenal phenomena excuse me one of my

896
00:39:33,290 --> 00:39:30,540
first concerns is really about the

897
00:39:35,089 --> 00:39:33,300
safety of Nevada's military Aviator

898
00:39:37,730 --> 00:39:35,099
so we have Airman stationed at Nellis

899
00:39:40,010 --> 00:39:37,740
Air Force Base Naval aviators flying at

900
00:39:42,550 --> 00:39:40,020
Naval Air Station Fallon and service

901
00:39:44,990 --> 00:39:42,560
members across from across the world

902
00:39:46,670 --> 00:39:45,000
training at the Nevada test and training

903
00:39:48,589 --> 00:39:46,680
range I know you know all this and

904
00:39:51,589 --> 00:39:48,599
unfortunately the existence of advanced

905
00:39:54,470 --> 00:39:51,599
uaps in the U.S airspace and over U.S

906
00:39:55,790 --> 00:39:54,480
military installations not a new

907
00:39:57,829 --> 00:39:55,800
phenomenon

908
00:40:02,089 --> 00:39:57,839
the Navy's officially acknowledged that

909
00:40:04,730 --> 00:40:02,099
between 2004 and 2021 11 near misses

910
00:40:07,730 --> 00:40:04,740
occurred involving uaps it required

911
00:40:09,890 --> 00:40:07,740
pilot action and follow-up reports as a

912
00:40:12,589 --> 00:40:09,900
result in 2019 the Navy established a

913
00:40:14,930 --> 00:40:12,599
protocol for Pilots to report on their

914
00:40:17,690 --> 00:40:14,940
dangerous encounters so could you speak

915
00:40:19,970 --> 00:40:17,700
to any ongoing efforts within DOD to

916
00:40:23,210 --> 00:40:19,980
ensure the safety of our aviators with a

917
00:40:24,950 --> 00:40:23,220
potential UAP encounter and what's your

918
00:40:27,050 --> 00:40:24,960
relationship with North com NORAD

919
00:40:30,710 --> 00:40:27,060
spacecom when it comes to this immediate

920
00:40:32,450 --> 00:40:30,720
real-time response and how they're

921
00:40:35,230 --> 00:40:32,460
they're right there in the moment right

922
00:40:38,750 --> 00:40:35,240
absolutely that's a great question so

923
00:40:41,270 --> 00:40:38,760
let me start with my relationship with

924
00:40:43,430 --> 00:40:41,280
the commands are are very good I just

925
00:40:45,290 --> 00:40:43,440
came back from uh sitting down with with

926
00:40:47,390 --> 00:40:45,300
General van hurk and all the all the J

927
00:40:49,670 --> 00:40:47,400
staff out at North com a couple weeks

928
00:40:52,310 --> 00:40:49,680
ago talking through exactly what we need

929
00:40:53,569 --> 00:40:52,320
to do to help them get their arms around

930
00:40:57,109 --> 00:40:53,579
us

931
00:40:59,630 --> 00:40:57,119
we are also working very closely with

932
00:41:02,329 --> 00:40:59,640
joint staff and the joint staff has just

933
00:41:04,730 --> 00:41:02,339
been very outstanding in helping work

934
00:41:08,050 --> 00:41:04,740
through policy and guidance issues to

935
00:41:13,490 --> 00:41:10,490
and I would like to just make sure that

936
00:41:16,329 --> 00:41:13,500
we we message back to all of the

937
00:41:19,550 --> 00:41:16,339
operators the importance of their

938
00:41:21,050 --> 00:41:19,560
reporting and the fact that you're about

939
00:41:22,970 --> 00:41:21,060
to get a you know a bunch of new

940
00:41:25,010 --> 00:41:22,980
requirements that we're issuing through

941
00:41:26,990 --> 00:41:25,020
the joint staff

942
00:41:30,230 --> 00:41:27,000
on all of the data that we're going to

943
00:41:33,770 --> 00:41:30,240
need you to save and report back to us

944
00:41:36,170 --> 00:41:33,780
it is invaluable and we are working to

945
00:41:37,790 --> 00:41:36,180
try to to take the most advantage of

946
00:41:39,109 --> 00:41:37,800
that to learn what it is that we're

947
00:41:41,930 --> 00:41:39,119
trying to mitigate

948
00:41:43,930 --> 00:41:41,940
to get directly to your question

949
00:41:46,130 --> 00:41:43,940
first thing that we're doing is

950
00:41:48,050 --> 00:41:46,140
normalizing our reporting right we're

951
00:41:49,810 --> 00:41:48,060
standardizing our reporting and the

952
00:41:51,950 --> 00:41:49,820
requirements associated with that

953
00:41:55,130 --> 00:41:51,960
guidance from The Joint staff I think

954
00:41:56,930 --> 00:41:55,140
goes out maybe this week maybe next week

955
00:41:58,490 --> 00:41:56,940
on that we've been working with them for

956
00:42:00,470 --> 00:41:58,500
some months that does exactly what I

957
00:42:02,150 --> 00:42:00,480
just said it gives them timelines it

958
00:42:05,329 --> 00:42:02,160
gives them requirements it gives them

959
00:42:08,089 --> 00:42:05,339
here's all the data you have to have

960
00:42:10,310 --> 00:42:08,099
um and you got to retain it

961
00:42:13,430 --> 00:42:10,320
the next thing that comes after that is

962
00:42:16,670 --> 00:42:13,440
a plan ORD that will go out to the

963
00:42:18,170 --> 00:42:16,680
commands for mitigation and response so

964
00:42:19,250 --> 00:42:18,180
there's a couple of things that we have

965
00:42:24,170 --> 00:42:19,260
to do

966
00:42:28,010 --> 00:42:24,180
one I need to work with the commands and

967
00:42:30,470 --> 00:42:28,020
with the IC and with our outside of our

968
00:42:32,050 --> 00:42:30,480
DOD and IC Partners to extend our

969
00:42:35,030 --> 00:42:32,060
collection posture

970
00:42:37,250 --> 00:42:35,040
targeted at some of these key areas that

971
00:42:40,130 --> 00:42:37,260
you saw on that heat map

972
00:42:43,550 --> 00:42:40,140
that have a lot of activity so that we

973
00:42:46,130 --> 00:42:43,560
can turn on extra collection when an

974
00:42:47,829 --> 00:42:46,140
operator sees something so part of this

975
00:42:51,170 --> 00:42:47,839
is generating

976
00:42:53,930 --> 00:42:51,180
as a response function in what we call a

977
00:42:55,970 --> 00:42:53,940
tactic technique and procedure for an

978
00:42:58,069 --> 00:42:55,980
operator when he sees something calls

979
00:43:00,530 --> 00:42:58,079
back to the operations floor they can

980
00:43:02,750 --> 00:43:00,540
turn on additional collection what does

981
00:43:04,550 --> 00:43:02,760
that collection look like how do I bring

982
00:43:07,309 --> 00:43:04,560
all that together so I can get more data

983
00:43:09,530 --> 00:43:07,319
on what is that thing can I ask really

984
00:43:11,569 --> 00:43:09,540
quickly do you have the authorities you

985
00:43:15,050 --> 00:43:11,579
need to extend your collection posture

986
00:43:16,849 --> 00:43:15,060
between agencies or or branches of the

987
00:43:19,370 --> 00:43:16,859
military because that seems to me to

988
00:43:20,990 --> 00:43:19,380
maybe be a sticking point I know my

989
00:43:22,270 --> 00:43:21,000
time's just about up I'd love to follow

990
00:43:24,950 --> 00:43:22,280
up about your risk management

991
00:43:26,809 --> 00:43:24,960
methodologies for some of these but do

992
00:43:29,329 --> 00:43:26,819
you need any authorities that you don't

993
00:43:30,829 --> 00:43:29,339
have to uh get get the data there are

994
00:43:32,630 --> 00:43:30,839
some authorities that we need we

995
00:43:35,690 --> 00:43:32,640
currently are operating under title 10

996
00:43:37,849 --> 00:43:35,700
authorities but we have you know good

997
00:43:40,010 --> 00:43:37,859
relationships across the other agencies

998
00:43:42,230 --> 00:43:40,020
but having additional authorities for

999
00:43:43,730 --> 00:43:42,240
collection tasking counterintelligence

1000
00:43:45,589 --> 00:43:43,740
that's something those are all things

1001
00:43:47,690 --> 00:43:45,599
that would be helpful yes

1002
00:43:49,609 --> 00:43:47,700
thank you to follow up Dr Kirkpatrick

1003
00:43:50,990 --> 00:43:49,619
will you help us write that language so

1004
00:43:52,430 --> 00:43:51,000
we can put it in the defense bill this

1005
00:43:55,910 --> 00:43:52,440
year so that we know what authorities

1006
00:43:57,410 --> 00:43:55,920
you need we can do that thank you

1007
00:43:58,609 --> 00:43:57,420
um we're going to start second round so

1008
00:44:00,349 --> 00:43:58,619
if you want to stay you can ask another

1009
00:44:02,210 --> 00:44:00,359
round I have at least three more

1010
00:44:04,069 --> 00:44:02,220
questions so

1011
00:44:06,770 --> 00:44:04,079
do you want to do you want to go right

1012
00:44:19,250 --> 00:44:06,780
now so you in case you have to leave

1013
00:44:22,849 --> 00:44:20,170
um

1014
00:44:25,370 --> 00:44:22,859
spy balloon it did cross through the U.S

1015
00:44:28,130 --> 00:44:25,380
airspace shot down by a Sidewinder

1016
00:44:30,950 --> 00:44:28,140
missile fired from an F-22

1017
00:44:33,109 --> 00:44:30,960
Sidewinders cost us close to half a

1018
00:44:35,450 --> 00:44:33,119
million dollars each

1019
00:44:37,370 --> 00:44:35,460
so given the cost of these missiles the

1020
00:44:39,109 --> 00:44:37,380
cost per flight all of these other

1021
00:44:41,150 --> 00:44:39,119
things like I said follow up on the

1022
00:44:42,589 --> 00:44:41,160
authorities your methodologies the data

1023
00:44:45,170 --> 00:44:42,599
collection they can help us in other

1024
00:44:47,930 --> 00:44:45,180
ways but how do you think we can develop

1025
00:44:50,690 --> 00:44:47,940
a sustainable affordable response to

1026
00:44:53,089 --> 00:44:50,700
uaps where we need to

1027
00:44:55,849 --> 00:44:53,099
um that may that will definitely violate

1028
00:44:58,130 --> 00:44:55,859
our airspace not may definitely violate

1029
00:44:59,809 --> 00:44:58,140
our airspace every chance that they can

1030
00:45:01,730 --> 00:44:59,819
get because there are adversaries they

1031
00:45:03,890 --> 00:45:01,740
want this information so what do you

1032
00:45:07,370 --> 00:45:03,900
think some cost-effective measures might

1033
00:45:08,809 --> 00:45:07,380
be that we can get what we need out of

1034
00:45:10,250 --> 00:45:08,819
that or take them down whatever is

1035
00:45:12,050 --> 00:45:10,260
appropriate whatever the appropriate

1036
00:45:13,970 --> 00:45:12,060
measure is let's put it there so that

1037
00:45:15,650 --> 00:45:13,980
that is actually wrapped into the plan

1038
00:45:18,170 --> 00:45:15,660
ORD that we're working with joint staff

1039
00:45:20,630 --> 00:45:18,180
to send out what are the commands need

1040
00:45:23,809 --> 00:45:20,640
from both a capabilities perspective for

1041
00:45:26,930 --> 00:45:23,819
kinetic and non-kinetic engagements what

1042
00:45:31,250 --> 00:45:26,940
are the response functions of the of the

1043
00:45:33,170 --> 00:45:31,260
particular wings or or navy what have

1044
00:45:36,109 --> 00:45:33,180
you and then

1045
00:45:37,670 --> 00:45:36,119
what authorities do they need so one of

1046
00:45:39,770 --> 00:45:37,680
the one of the challenges that we've

1047
00:45:42,530 --> 00:45:39,780
seen is is you know there's an

1048
00:45:45,650 --> 00:45:42,540
authorities issues with the with the

1049
00:45:46,970 --> 00:45:45,660
owners operators of those ranges that

1050
00:45:49,790 --> 00:45:46,980
they need to work through and we're

1051
00:45:50,990 --> 00:45:49,800
working that with joint staff and nosd

1052
00:45:54,109 --> 00:45:51,000
so

1053
00:45:56,270 --> 00:45:54,119
the big picture we need to do all that

1054
00:45:57,950 --> 00:45:56,280
if you want to get down to the specifics

1055
00:45:59,750 --> 00:45:57,960
for you know there are non-kinetic

1056
00:46:02,589 --> 00:45:59,760
options to engage pretty much everything

1057
00:46:05,210 --> 00:46:02,599
right whether it's electronic warfare

1058
00:46:07,670 --> 00:46:05,220
whether it's you know Laser Technology

1059
00:46:10,430 --> 00:46:07,680
that's where this data having a good

1060
00:46:13,370 --> 00:46:10,440
data collection Predictive Analytics you

1061
00:46:15,170 --> 00:46:13,380
can inform make some assumptions on

1062
00:46:17,750 --> 00:46:15,180
possibilities that's right and we will

1063
00:46:19,849 --> 00:46:17,760
inform uh recommendations back to the

1064
00:46:21,890 --> 00:46:19,859
department on here's what could work

1065
00:46:22,970 --> 00:46:21,900
here's what we've seen work here's what

1066
00:46:24,710 --> 00:46:22,980
doesn't work

1067
00:46:27,170 --> 00:46:24,720
thank you so much thank you madam chair

1068
00:46:29,329 --> 00:46:27,180
I appreciate it thank you very much

1069
00:46:31,010 --> 00:46:29,339
um I just wanted to just talk a little

1070
00:46:33,950 --> 00:46:31,020
bit about your Logistics who you report

1071
00:46:36,230 --> 00:46:33,960
to how that's going uh whether you need

1072
00:46:38,089 --> 00:46:36,240
different reporting Lines by

1073
00:46:39,829 --> 00:46:38,099
Congressional legislation your office is

1074
00:46:41,510 --> 00:46:39,839
administratively located with the office

1075
00:46:43,309 --> 00:46:41,520
of the undersecretary of defense for

1076
00:46:45,050 --> 00:46:43,319
intelligence security but you're not

1077
00:46:47,150 --> 00:46:45,060
substantively subordinate to the under

1078
00:46:49,130 --> 00:46:47,160
secretary rather you are a direct report

1079
00:46:50,569 --> 00:46:49,140
to the deputy secretary are you taking

1080
00:46:52,430 --> 00:46:50,579
Direction directly from the deputy

1081
00:46:54,589 --> 00:46:52,440
secretary are you able to meet and brief

1082
00:46:57,829 --> 00:46:54,599
the deputy secretary

1083
00:46:59,930 --> 00:46:57,839
um is the office of USD ins

1084
00:47:01,609 --> 00:46:59,940
um working with you to have the right

1085
00:47:06,829 --> 00:47:01,619
framework

1086
00:47:10,309 --> 00:47:06,839
so USD ins and the uh I I currently

1087
00:47:13,609 --> 00:47:10,319
report to USD ins

1088
00:47:14,450 --> 00:47:13,619
until they come up with the the plan for

1089
00:47:17,390 --> 00:47:14,460
how they're going to implement

1090
00:47:24,170 --> 00:47:20,930
DOD and dni are working through that now

1091
00:47:27,050 --> 00:47:24,180
I'd have to refer you back to USD ins on

1092
00:47:30,770 --> 00:47:27,060
what their plan is

1093
00:47:34,730 --> 00:47:32,990
do I need to update your reporting

1094
00:47:35,990 --> 00:47:34,740
structure in the next defense bill or is

1095
00:47:37,670 --> 00:47:36,000
this something that you think will work

1096
00:47:39,290 --> 00:47:37,680
its way out or does it need further

1097
00:47:41,210 --> 00:47:39,300
Clarity I think they're planning on

1098
00:47:44,150 --> 00:47:41,220
coming back to you with an answer on

1099
00:47:45,829 --> 00:47:44,160
what that plan is and I think at that

1100
00:47:49,309 --> 00:47:45,839
time that will inform

1101
00:47:52,430 --> 00:47:49,319
what you want to do okay thank you

1102
00:47:53,690 --> 00:47:52,440
um as you know Dr Kirkpatrick Congress

1103
00:47:55,430 --> 00:47:53,700
has mandated that your office

1104
00:47:57,650 --> 00:47:55,440
established a discoverable and

1105
00:48:00,050 --> 00:47:57,660
accessible electronic method for

1106
00:48:02,870 --> 00:48:00,060
potential Witnesses of UAP incidents and

1107
00:48:04,670 --> 00:48:02,880
potential participants in government UAP

1108
00:48:06,470 --> 00:48:04,680
related activities to contact your

1109
00:48:08,569 --> 00:48:06,480
office and tell their stories

1110
00:48:09,410 --> 00:48:08,579
Congress also set up a process whereby

1111
00:48:11,870 --> 00:48:09,420
people

1112
00:48:13,370 --> 00:48:11,880
subject to non-disclosure agreements

1113
00:48:14,630 --> 00:48:13,380
preventing them from disclosing what

1114
00:48:17,089 --> 00:48:14,640
they may have witnessed or participated

1115
00:48:18,589 --> 00:48:17,099
in could tell you what they know that

1116
00:48:21,230 --> 00:48:18,599
risk of Retribution from the or

1117
00:48:22,730 --> 00:48:21,240
violation of their ndas have you

1118
00:48:24,410 --> 00:48:22,740
submitted a public-facing website

1119
00:48:26,870 --> 00:48:24,420
product for approval to your superiors

1120
00:48:30,650 --> 00:48:26,880
and how long has it been under review

1121
00:48:34,609 --> 00:48:30,660
I have we submitted the first version of

1122
00:48:38,630 --> 00:48:36,829
and do you have an estimate from them

1123
00:48:42,710 --> 00:48:38,640
when they will respond and when you'll

1124
00:48:44,390 --> 00:48:42,720
have feedback on that no I don't okay we

1125
00:48:46,370 --> 00:48:44,400
will Author a letter asking for that

1126
00:48:49,190 --> 00:48:46,380
timely response

1127
00:48:51,530 --> 00:48:49,200
um to your superiors oh

1128
00:48:54,349 --> 00:48:51,540
when when do you expect that you will

1129
00:48:57,349 --> 00:48:54,359
establish a public-facing discoverable

1130
00:49:00,890 --> 00:48:57,359
um an access portal for people to use to

1131
00:49:04,130 --> 00:49:00,900
contact your office as the law requires

1132
00:49:07,069 --> 00:49:04,140
so I would like to First say thank you

1133
00:49:09,589 --> 00:49:07,079
all very much for referring the

1134
00:49:12,109 --> 00:49:09,599
witnesses that you have thus far to us I

1135
00:49:14,510 --> 00:49:12,119
appreciate that we've brought in nearly

1136
00:49:16,609 --> 00:49:14,520
two dozen so far it's been it's been

1137
00:49:18,530 --> 00:49:16,619
very uh helpful I'd ask that you

1138
00:49:19,930 --> 00:49:18,540
continue to do that until we have an

1139
00:49:23,210 --> 00:49:19,940
approved plan

1140
00:49:26,270 --> 00:49:23,220
we have a multi-phased approach for

1141
00:49:28,490 --> 00:49:26,280
doing that that we've been uh

1142
00:49:30,530 --> 00:49:28,500
socializing and have submitted for

1143
00:49:32,109 --> 00:49:30,540
approval

1144
00:49:34,670 --> 00:49:32,119
sometime

1145
00:49:37,010 --> 00:49:34,680
and once that happens then we should be

1146
00:49:39,530 --> 00:49:37,020
able to push all that out and get get

1147
00:49:41,329 --> 00:49:39,540
this a little more automated great

1148
00:49:44,270 --> 00:49:41,339
um what I would ask though is as you all

1149
00:49:46,550 --> 00:49:44,280
continue to refer to us and refer

1150
00:49:50,030 --> 00:49:46,560
witnesses to us I'd appreciate if you do

1151
00:49:51,890 --> 00:49:50,040
that please try to prioritize the ones

1152
00:49:55,849 --> 00:49:51,900
that you want to do because we do have a

1153
00:49:57,589 --> 00:49:55,859
small research staff dealing with that

1154
00:49:59,569 --> 00:49:57,599
thank you

1155
00:50:01,190 --> 00:49:59,579
um and then do you have any uh plans for

1156
00:50:03,349 --> 00:50:01,200
public engagement that you want to share

1157
00:50:06,109 --> 00:50:03,359
now that you think it's important that

1158
00:50:08,809 --> 00:50:06,119
the public knows what the plan is

1159
00:50:11,589 --> 00:50:08,819
so we have a uh

1160
00:50:14,089 --> 00:50:11,599
a number of public engagement

1161
00:50:15,309 --> 00:50:14,099
recommendations according to our

1162
00:50:18,109 --> 00:50:15,319
strategic plan

1163
00:50:20,750 --> 00:50:18,119
all of those have been submitted for

1164
00:50:22,250 --> 00:50:20,760
approval they have to be approved by USD

1165
00:50:24,770 --> 00:50:22,260
ins

1166
00:50:27,230 --> 00:50:24,780
are waiting for approval to go do that

1167
00:50:29,930 --> 00:50:27,240
okay I will follow up on that

1168
00:50:31,430 --> 00:50:29,940
um and then my last question is about

1169
00:50:33,410 --> 00:50:31,440
um

1170
00:50:35,210 --> 00:50:33,420
the integration of departments UAP

1171
00:50:37,730 --> 00:50:35,220
operations research analysis and

1172
00:50:40,550 --> 00:50:37,740
strategic Communications

1173
00:50:42,530 --> 00:50:40,560
um during the recent UAP incidents over

1174
00:50:45,230 --> 00:50:42,540
North America it didn't appear that you

1175
00:50:46,670 --> 00:50:45,240
were allowed to play that role do you

1176
00:50:48,230 --> 00:50:46,680
agree that the public perception is

1177
00:50:49,670 --> 00:50:48,240
generally that you and your office did

1178
00:50:50,990 --> 00:50:49,680
not appear to play a major role in the

1179
00:50:53,049 --> 00:50:51,000
Department's response to the detection

1180
00:50:55,670 --> 00:50:53,059
of objects over North America

1181
00:50:57,230 --> 00:50:55,680
what can you tell us that's going on

1182
00:50:59,569 --> 00:50:57,240
behind the scenes from your perspective

1183
00:51:02,030 --> 00:50:59,579
and in the after action assessment

1184
00:51:03,470 --> 00:51:02,040
process is there awareness that there is

1185
00:51:06,650 --> 00:51:03,480
a need to operate differently in the

1186
00:51:09,109 --> 00:51:06,660
future and a commitment to doing so

1187
00:51:12,049 --> 00:51:09,119
when the when the objects were first

1188
00:51:15,890 --> 00:51:12,059
detected I got called by joint staff

1189
00:51:19,430 --> 00:51:15,900
leadership uh to come in uh late one

1190
00:51:22,849 --> 00:51:19,440
night to review events as they were unfo

1191
00:51:24,829 --> 00:51:22,859
unfolding and to give them a you know an

1192
00:51:25,930 --> 00:51:24,839
assessment based on what we knew at that

1193
00:51:29,450 --> 00:51:25,940
time

1194
00:51:33,109 --> 00:51:29,460
I did that I worked with the director of

1195
00:51:35,750 --> 00:51:33,119
joint staff the J2 and the j3 that night

1196
00:51:38,210 --> 00:51:35,760
and over the couple of following days on

1197
00:51:40,430 --> 00:51:38,220
what are the types of things that we are

1198
00:51:43,130 --> 00:51:40,440
tracking from a unidentified object

1199
00:51:45,650 --> 00:51:43,140
perspective what databases do we use

1200
00:51:48,829 --> 00:51:45,660
those sorts of things for for Norm for

1201
00:51:50,410 --> 00:51:48,839
known objects known tracking

1202
00:51:53,690 --> 00:51:50,420
um

1203
00:51:55,430 --> 00:51:53,700
beyond that the response I would have to

1204
00:51:57,829 --> 00:51:55,440
I would have to refer you back to the

1205
00:52:01,730 --> 00:51:57,839
White House for the decision on how they

1206
00:52:04,549 --> 00:52:01,740
did the response we did not play a role

1207
00:52:05,930 --> 00:52:04,559
in what you would respond other than

1208
00:52:06,589 --> 00:52:05,940
that initial

1209
00:52:08,569 --> 00:52:06,599
um

1210
00:52:13,609 --> 00:52:08,579
you know advice on what we are seeing

1211
00:52:20,329 --> 00:52:16,849
thank you Matt thank you madam chair

1212
00:52:23,030 --> 00:52:20,339
um Dr Kirkpatrick I I know that your

1213
00:52:26,390 --> 00:52:23,040
office has gotten a lot of attention uh

1214
00:52:28,910 --> 00:52:26,400
recently and of course any new agency

1215
00:52:32,690 --> 00:52:28,920
there tends to be a push to increase

1216
00:52:34,609 --> 00:52:32,700
size and and funding we want to make

1217
00:52:37,490 --> 00:52:34,619
sure that you're able to meet your goals

1218
00:52:40,069 --> 00:52:37,500
but what I also need to ensure is that

1219
00:52:42,829 --> 00:52:40,079
we're not duplicating or replicating

1220
00:52:46,549 --> 00:52:42,839
existing functions and creating

1221
00:52:49,609 --> 00:52:46,559
redundancy within DOD and the

1222
00:52:52,609 --> 00:52:49,619
interagency so what steps are you taking

1223
00:52:56,690 --> 00:52:52,619
right now to make sure that your

1224
00:53:00,589 --> 00:52:56,700
particular office and function is is

1225
00:53:03,049 --> 00:53:00,599
unique uh to any of the other agencies

1226
00:53:04,970 --> 00:53:03,059
that might be involved in these types of

1227
00:53:08,450 --> 00:53:04,980
cases yeah that's a that's a great

1228
00:53:10,609 --> 00:53:08,460
question so I would like to lay down

1229
00:53:12,589 --> 00:53:10,619
here's here's one of my

1230
00:53:15,650 --> 00:53:12,599
sort of my mission and my goal and my

1231
00:53:18,049 --> 00:53:15,660
vision here so the vision is at one

1232
00:53:20,870 --> 00:53:18,059
point at some point in the future

1233
00:53:23,030 --> 00:53:20,880
you should not need an arrow if I'm

1234
00:53:25,309 --> 00:53:23,040
successful in what I'm doing we should

1235
00:53:27,650 --> 00:53:25,319
be able to normalize everything that

1236
00:53:30,650 --> 00:53:27,660
we're doing into existing processes

1237
00:53:32,390 --> 00:53:30,660
functions agencies and organizations and

1238
00:53:34,910 --> 00:53:32,400
make that part of their mission and

1239
00:53:38,809 --> 00:53:34,920
their role right now the niche that we

1240
00:53:41,450 --> 00:53:38,819
form is really going after the unknowns

1241
00:53:45,049 --> 00:53:41,460
if you I think you articulated it early

1242
00:53:47,089 --> 00:53:45,059
on this is a Hunt mission for what might

1243
00:53:48,829 --> 00:53:47,099
somebody be doing in our backyard that

1244
00:53:51,290 --> 00:53:48,839
we don't know about

1245
00:53:53,690 --> 00:53:51,300
all right well that that that is what we

1246
00:53:55,490 --> 00:53:53,700
are doing right but at some point we

1247
00:53:57,349 --> 00:53:55,500
should be able to normalize that that's

1248
00:53:59,510 --> 00:53:57,359
why it's so important the work we're

1249
00:54:03,349 --> 00:53:59,520
doing with joint staff to normalize that

1250
00:54:05,809 --> 00:54:03,359
into pilot DOD policy and guidance

1251
00:54:08,030 --> 00:54:05,819
we are bringing in all of our

1252
00:54:11,270 --> 00:54:08,040
interagency partners so NASA is

1253
00:54:13,910 --> 00:54:11,280
providing a liaison for us I have FBI

1254
00:54:15,829 --> 00:54:13,920
liaison I have OSI liaison I have

1255
00:54:19,069 --> 00:54:15,839
service Liaisons

1256
00:54:20,150 --> 00:54:19,079
the ice half of my staff come from the

1257
00:54:22,849 --> 00:54:20,160
IC

1258
00:54:24,710 --> 00:54:22,859
half of my staff come from other

1259
00:54:27,710 --> 00:54:24,720
scientific and Technical backgrounds I

1260
00:54:29,510 --> 00:54:27,720
have doe and so what we're trying to do

1261
00:54:34,069 --> 00:54:29,520
is Ensure

1262
00:54:36,829 --> 00:54:34,079
again as I make UAP into sap they get

1263
00:54:38,870 --> 00:54:36,839
handed off to the people that that is

1264
00:54:40,670 --> 00:54:38,880
their mission to go do

1265
00:54:42,890 --> 00:54:40,680
so that we aren't duplicating that I'm

1266
00:54:44,809 --> 00:54:42,900
not going to go chase the Chinese high

1267
00:54:47,210 --> 00:54:44,819
altitude balloon for example that's not

1268
00:54:49,790 --> 00:54:47,220
my job it's not an unknown and it's not

1269
00:54:52,670 --> 00:54:49,800
anomalous anymore now it goes over to

1270
00:54:54,530 --> 00:54:52,680
them come on very good thank you madam

1271
00:54:57,950 --> 00:54:54,540
chair

1272
00:54:59,809 --> 00:54:57,960
um I wanted just to follow up on the

1273
00:55:02,210 --> 00:54:59,819
filters for surveillance outside

1274
00:55:04,730 --> 00:55:02,220
observers have speculated that DOD sets

1275
00:55:06,410 --> 00:55:04,740
filters on certain sensors to eliminate

1276
00:55:08,710 --> 00:55:06,420
objects that are moving really fast or

1277
00:55:10,849 --> 00:55:08,720
slow because what we are looking for

1278
00:55:14,150 --> 00:55:10,859
militarily are conventional aircraft and

1279
00:55:16,370 --> 00:55:14,160
missiles UAP that doesn't fit into these

1280
00:55:18,710 --> 00:55:16,380
programs would thereby be weeded out and

1281
00:55:20,270 --> 00:55:18,720
never noticed this special speculation

1282
00:55:22,250 --> 00:55:20,280
was proven to be true during the UAP

1283
00:55:24,410 --> 00:55:22,260
incident over North America where DOD

1284
00:55:26,690 --> 00:55:24,420
publicly acknowledged that we were able

1285
00:55:28,809 --> 00:55:26,700
to start seeing these uops only when we

1286
00:55:31,069 --> 00:55:28,819
opened up these filters

1287
00:55:32,930 --> 00:55:31,079
obviously our military operators cannot

1288
00:55:35,030 --> 00:55:32,940
be overloaded with objects that are not

1289
00:55:36,710 --> 00:55:35,040
conventional aircraft or missiles can

1290
00:55:39,049 --> 00:55:36,720
you nonetheless make sure that the raw

1291
00:55:40,670 --> 00:55:39,059
data is being captured and subsequently

1292
00:55:43,309 --> 00:55:40,680
processed that your office knows what's

1293
00:55:44,870 --> 00:55:43,319
really out there and is that going to

1294
00:55:49,130 --> 00:55:44,880
cost money will you expect to pay for

1295
00:55:53,990 --> 00:55:51,589
one of the key tenants that we're trying

1296
00:55:56,210 --> 00:55:54,000
to do in our science plan is understand

1297
00:56:00,049 --> 00:55:56,220
what those signatures are

1298
00:56:03,410 --> 00:56:00,059
so we get all the raw for example radar

1299
00:56:05,690 --> 00:56:03,420
data prior to the scrubbing and

1300
00:56:08,990 --> 00:56:05,700
filtering to allow it to enter into our

1301
00:56:11,990 --> 00:56:09,000
weapon systems and our detection systems

1302
00:56:14,750 --> 00:56:12,000
we are now taking all that data and

1303
00:56:16,430 --> 00:56:14,760
cross-correlating it to what pilots are

1304
00:56:20,930 --> 00:56:16,440
saying they're seeing or other

1305
00:56:23,690 --> 00:56:20,940
observations from other operators

1306
00:56:26,390 --> 00:56:23,700
what that allows us to do is then see if

1307
00:56:30,290 --> 00:56:26,400
there are any any signatures in that

1308
00:56:32,030 --> 00:56:30,300
data that I can pull out generate uh

1309
00:56:34,849 --> 00:56:32,040
what we'll call automatic Target

1310
00:56:37,549 --> 00:56:34,859
recognition algorithms that allow us to

1311
00:56:43,250 --> 00:56:37,559
then use that signature associated with

1312
00:56:45,470 --> 00:56:43,260
a observed UAP whatever that UAP may be

1313
00:56:48,589 --> 00:56:45,480
we will then make those recommendations

1314
00:56:50,510 --> 00:56:48,599
of what those changes should be back to

1315
00:56:54,290 --> 00:56:50,520
the department so the deputy secretary

1316
00:56:55,849 --> 00:56:54,300
had asked me last October to make those

1317
00:56:59,750 --> 00:56:55,859
recommendations what changes do we need

1318
00:57:02,030 --> 00:56:59,760
to make to Radars to uh platforms to

1319
00:57:04,309 --> 00:57:02,040
detection systems and algorithms to to

1320
00:57:06,109 --> 00:57:04,319
pull on those those algorithms and make

1321
00:57:07,549 --> 00:57:06,119
those changes that's going to take some

1322
00:57:10,010 --> 00:57:07,559
time that's where the research and

1323
00:57:12,710 --> 00:57:10,020
development comes in right it's not

1324
00:57:13,910 --> 00:57:12,720
it's not instantaneous right now a lot

1325
00:57:22,730 --> 00:57:13,920
of the

1326
00:57:25,609 --> 00:57:22,740
ranges of those filters have been

1327
00:57:27,650 --> 00:57:25,619
identified by people in the loop and you

1328
00:57:31,250 --> 00:57:27,660
can't have people in the loop all the

1329
00:57:34,250 --> 00:57:31,260
time it's just not cost effective

1330
00:57:36,710 --> 00:57:34,260
so part of our budget is working through

1331
00:57:38,390 --> 00:57:36,720
what is what does that look like

1332
00:57:40,970 --> 00:57:38,400
and then making those recommendations

1333
00:57:46,010 --> 00:57:40,980
back to the big program offices for them

1334
00:57:49,309 --> 00:57:48,049
my last question is about the academic

1335
00:57:51,170 --> 00:57:49,319
Community

1336
00:57:52,670 --> 00:57:51,180
um can you give us an update on sort of

1337
00:57:55,849 --> 00:57:52,680
how you collaborate with the academic

1338
00:57:57,770 --> 00:57:55,859
community and whether how the

1339
00:58:01,430 --> 00:57:57,780
independent study being done by NASA

1340
00:58:03,290 --> 00:58:01,440
complements arrows work sure

1341
00:58:05,150 --> 00:58:03,300
two questions so I'm going to try to

1342
00:58:07,190 --> 00:58:05,160
make it quick the uh

1343
00:58:10,790 --> 00:58:07,200
in 1979

1344
00:58:13,609 --> 00:58:10,800
Carl Sagan said extraordinary claims

1345
00:58:15,530 --> 00:58:13,619
require extraordinary evidence

1346
00:58:18,589 --> 00:58:15,540
I would go one step further and I would

1347
00:58:19,849 --> 00:58:18,599
say extraordinary claims require not

1348
00:58:21,950 --> 00:58:19,859
only extraordinary evidence but

1349
00:58:23,930 --> 00:58:21,960
extraordinary science and so how do you

1350
00:58:27,290 --> 00:58:23,940
do that you do that with the scientific

1351
00:58:30,890 --> 00:58:27,300
method right so as arrow is developing

1352
00:58:33,890 --> 00:58:30,900
and implementing its science plan it has

1353
00:58:36,829 --> 00:58:33,900
to do so grounded in a solid foundation

1354
00:58:39,109 --> 00:58:36,839
of scientific theory across the entire

1355
00:58:42,470 --> 00:58:39,119
range of hypotheses

1356
00:58:44,690 --> 00:58:42,480
that have been presented for what UAP

1357
00:58:48,710 --> 00:58:44,700
are

1358
00:58:52,490 --> 00:58:48,720
that range spans adversary breakthrough

1359
00:58:55,010 --> 00:58:52,500
technology on one hand known objects and

1360
00:58:56,450 --> 00:58:55,020
phenomena in the middle all the way to

1361
00:58:58,250 --> 00:58:56,460
the extreme theories of

1362
00:59:02,750 --> 00:58:58,260
extraterrestrials

1363
00:59:04,549 --> 00:59:02,760
all of that has physics-based signatures

1364
00:59:07,670 --> 00:59:04,559
associated with it whether it's

1365
00:59:10,250 --> 00:59:07,680
theoretical from the academic community

1366
00:59:11,470 --> 00:59:10,260
known from things like Hypersonic

1367
00:59:14,930 --> 00:59:11,480
weapons

1368
00:59:17,510 --> 00:59:14,940
or adversary breakthrough Technologies

1369
00:59:19,730 --> 00:59:17,520
as we've talked about before

1370
00:59:21,170 --> 00:59:19,740
the known objects that we have to go

1371
00:59:24,349 --> 00:59:21,180
measure

1372
00:59:28,069 --> 00:59:24,359
the idea is across that entire range you

1373
00:59:30,710 --> 00:59:28,079
have to come up with peer-reviewed

1374
00:59:33,049 --> 00:59:30,720
scientific basis for all of it

1375
00:59:36,470 --> 00:59:33,059
the academic Community plays a very big

1376
00:59:38,329 --> 00:59:36,480
role on the one end of the spectrum

1377
00:59:40,609 --> 00:59:38,339
the intelligence community on the other

1378
00:59:41,750 --> 00:59:40,619
end of the spectrum and then measurement

1379
00:59:44,990 --> 00:59:41,760
in the middle

1380
00:59:49,210 --> 00:59:45,000
once I have those signatures identified

1381
00:59:51,589 --> 00:59:49,220
in invalidated peer-reviewed

1382
00:59:53,809 --> 00:59:51,599
documents then I have something to point

1383
00:59:55,430 --> 00:59:53,819
to for all that data

1384
00:59:57,230 --> 00:59:55,440
because all that data is going to match

1385
00:59:59,569 --> 00:59:57,240
one of those signatures

1386
01:00:02,569 --> 00:59:59,579
right and then I can go well it's that

1387
01:00:05,690 --> 01:00:02,579
and not that or it's that

1388
01:00:09,109 --> 01:00:05,700
and that helps us go through all that

1389
01:00:12,470 --> 01:00:09,119
where NASA comes in and and the the

1390
01:00:15,770 --> 01:00:12,480
study that they're doing which um

1391
01:00:21,109 --> 01:00:15,780
uh supporting is

1392
01:00:23,930 --> 01:00:21,119
really looking at the unclassified data

1393
01:00:26,990 --> 01:00:23,940
sources that might be used to augment

1394
01:00:29,030 --> 01:00:27,000
our classified data sources to

1395
01:00:31,370 --> 01:00:29,040
understand if there's a signature there

1396
01:00:34,849 --> 01:00:31,380
we can pull on so very similar to The

1397
01:00:39,589 --> 01:00:37,250
civil capabilities so for example we

1398
01:00:42,170 --> 01:00:39,599
have a lot of climate science satellites

1399
01:00:43,609 --> 01:00:42,180
for example that look at Earth

1400
01:00:45,530 --> 01:00:43,619
lots of them

1401
01:00:48,530 --> 01:00:45,540
how many of those

1402
01:00:51,950 --> 01:00:48,540
is the data valuable

1403
01:00:55,309 --> 01:00:51,960
in seeing these kinds of objects

1404
01:00:58,130 --> 01:00:55,319
the challenge in that is those those

1405
01:01:00,049 --> 01:00:58,140
platforms don't necessarily have the

1406
01:01:02,690 --> 01:01:00,059
resolution you need so if you remember

1407
01:01:04,789 --> 01:01:02,700
the slide I put up there with the trends

1408
01:01:07,789 --> 01:01:04,799
the size of the objects we're looking

1409
01:01:09,410 --> 01:01:07,799
for are typically reported to be one to

1410
01:01:11,630 --> 01:01:09,420
four meters

1411
01:01:14,510 --> 01:01:11,640
well the resolution of many of the

1412
01:01:17,030 --> 01:01:14,520
climate science civil um science you

1413
01:01:19,130 --> 01:01:17,040
know civil satellites was much larger

1414
01:01:20,750 --> 01:01:19,140
than that which means you'd have a hard

1415
01:01:24,109 --> 01:01:20,760
time picking out something that's

1416
01:01:26,450 --> 01:01:24,119
smaller than a pixel on the imagery on

1417
01:01:28,849 --> 01:01:26,460
the data that's not to say all of it's

1418
01:01:30,349 --> 01:01:28,859
not useful and there are ways of pulling

1419
01:01:32,569 --> 01:01:30,359
through that data and going through that

1420
01:01:35,510 --> 01:01:32,579
is what NASA is focused on right now is

1421
01:01:37,430 --> 01:01:35,520
what is what are some other data sources

1422
01:01:41,270 --> 01:01:37,440
that could be used in addition things

1423
01:01:43,789 --> 01:01:41,280
like open source and crowdsourcing of of

1424
01:01:45,589 --> 01:01:43,799
data we're exploring public-private

1425
01:01:47,329 --> 01:01:45,599
Partnerships ma'am as you know we've

1426
01:01:50,930 --> 01:01:47,339
talked about in the past

1427
01:01:52,450 --> 01:01:50,940
to look at is there a way to

1428
01:01:55,010 --> 01:01:52,460
smartly

1429
01:01:56,630 --> 01:01:55,020
crowdsource additional data that might

1430
01:02:00,589 --> 01:01:56,640
be useful

1431
01:02:02,870 --> 01:02:00,599
to augment some of my classified sources

1432
01:02:04,430 --> 01:02:02,880
and what does that look like and how

1433
01:02:06,890 --> 01:02:04,440
would we do it so that we're not

1434
01:02:13,789 --> 01:02:06,900
overwhelmed by you know everybody who

1435
01:02:16,730 --> 01:02:15,530
else like to tell the committee before

1436
01:02:18,410 --> 01:02:16,740
we close

1437
01:02:19,250 --> 01:02:18,420
don't you have another round yeah do you

1438
01:02:21,230 --> 01:02:19,260
have anything else you'd like to tell

1439
01:02:23,390 --> 01:02:21,240
the committee before we close thank you

1440
01:02:25,430 --> 01:02:23,400
very much for allowing us to come and

1441
01:02:27,349 --> 01:02:25,440
share a little bit of insight into what

1442
01:02:28,789 --> 01:02:27,359
arrow is up to and what we're doing I

1443
01:02:31,010 --> 01:02:28,799
hope to be able to share a whole lot

1444
01:02:33,349 --> 01:02:31,020
more in the future

1445
01:02:35,690 --> 01:02:33,359
um we have a lot of work to do so if you

1446
01:02:38,089 --> 01:02:35,700
don't hear from me outside it's because

1447
01:02:39,829 --> 01:02:38,099
we've got a lot of work to do